That choice is constructed, and hence influenced by a wealth of variables, has become axiomatic to consumer psychology, indeed, marketing and psychology in general (see for example, Bettman, Luce, and Payne, 1998). In this Research Dialogue, Ravi Dhar and Margaret Gorlin (2013a—in this issue) advance a conceptual framework by which to organize, and understand, the myriad effects previously uncovered. Specifically, the authors build upon the dual-process model advanced by Kahneman and Frederick (2002). In brief, this model hypothesizes that human judgment can be understood to be the result of two broad sets of processes, one of which is intuitive, requiring little or no deliberation (referred to as System I) and the other of which is deliberative, thoughtful, and effortful (referred to as System II). Dhar and Gorlin further develop this dual-process approach to account for when and how preferences are constructed. Specifically, they hypothesize that choices will be the result of System I to the extent that System I’s response is strongly consistent with a choice, and to the extent that motivation is relatively low. In contrast, choices will be the result of System II to the extent that System I’s response is weak, and/or there exists motivation to modify System I’s reaction.

Four commentaries to Dhar and Gorlin’s paper are provided by noted experts. Duane Wegener and Yi-Wen Chien (2013—in this issue) rely upon the dual-processing framework offered by the Elaboration Likelihood Model (Petty, 1977; Petty & Briñol, 2012; Petty & Cacioppo, 1979, 1981, 1986) to suggest how Dhar and Gorlin’s framework might be enhanced. Justin Martin and Steven Sloman (in this issue) suggest that Systems I and II ought to be better understood as operating in parallel (and interactively) rather than sequentially. They articulate how such a modification bears upon their categorization of choice effects. Bettman Gawronski (2013—in this issue) is concerned that the dual-process model explanation offered by Dhar and Gorlin is potentially circular in logic. As a way to overcome this difficulty, he articulates the distinction between associative and propositional evaluative processes (APE; Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2006, 2011), and suggests that such a distinction may prove more useful in developing a framework by which to understand choice. Keith Stanovich (2013—in this issue) applauds Dhar and Gorlin’s integration of choice with dual-process models. He suggests, however, that such an integration does not undermine or contradict previously offered explanations. Dhar and Ghorlin (2013b—in this issue) provide a response to the commentaries.

It is hoped that this Research Dialogue will be of interest to choice researchers in that the Dhar and Ghorlin paper provides an interesting and potentially useful framework by which to consider choice construction. At the same time, it is hoped that this Research Dialogue will be of interest to those interested in dual-model processes. This set of papers provides a particularly helpful means by which to consider and evaluate different approaches to theoretical conceptualization of dual-processes.

References


